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A vanguard behind 
the times?
— Bernard Moss on the French 
communists
The 1981 elections in France represented a 
victory not only of the left and the forces of 
labor over the right and capital, but one also 
of the gradualists over the radicals in the labor 
movement. Step by step Francois M itterrand 
had achieved his grand design — uniting and 
revitalising a socialist party out of the ruins of 
the SFIO , engaging a political alliance that 
strengthened the socialists at the expense of 
the communists, defying and defeating his 
allies in electoral com petition and forcing 
their capitulation before a program  bearing 
the m arks of class compromise. For the 
victory of the left, essentially electoralist in 
nature, came as a setback for the PCF, the 
CGT and working class movements, which 
r e m a in e d  d iv id e d  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  
immobilised by the delegation of power. 
Bowing to popular aspirations for change, the 
PC F  conceded defeat, fell into line behind 
M itterrand and undertook a review of past 
errors that had led to the loss of one quarter of 
its electorate.
This exercise of self-criticism, initiated and 
orchestrated by the leadership, culminated in 
the final resolution approved with only two 
abstentions at the 24th congress of the P C F  in 
February. The criticism, evasive with respect 
to current responsibilities, was sweeping and 
radical with respect to the historic past. Blame 
for the M ay defeat was attributed to  late de- 
stalinisation after 1956 and the delay in 
chartering the dem ocratic road to socialism
c u r r e n t ly  e m b o d ie d  in  a strategie  
autogestionnaire — a strategy relying upon 
trade union struggles and worker initiative 
and tending tow ard a society of self­
management.
As a result of this delay, the PCF fell behind 
the times and resurrected a popular front 
strategy that was ill-suited to the new 
aspirations for self-management and to a 
Presidential regime that gave the advantage 
to the more centrist partner in any electoral 
alliance. The form  of unity adopted — a 
com m on program  of government — had 
served to  ham per the independent initiative of 
the class and the party  and to conceal 
differences with the socialists. The Common 
Program  was too abstract, general and 
advanced for popular comprehension. 
Because it failed to articulate a more 
decentralised participatory approach, it left 
the P C F  open to charges that it wanted a 
Soviet-style bureaucratic socialism for 
France. W ith the exception of the form of 
intervention in two notorious incidents — 
M archais' televised approbation  of the 
Afghan invasion direct from  Moscow and the 
bulldozering of an insalubrious immigrant 
hostel at Vitry during the Presidential 
campaign — the leadership scrupulously side­
stepped criticism of its conduct since the 
break with the socialists in 1978. By assigning 
blame to  M aurice Thorez and the historic 
past, the criticism served to  justify current
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policies and leadership and to mask those 
structural problems and errors that had led to 
the May defeat.
The blanket repudiation of the popular 
front strategy — a criticism extended to the 
1930s as well — was an historical sleight of 
hand that was unw orthy of a party conscious 
of its heritage. W hatever the problem s of a 
popular front, it has been a m ainstay of 
revolutionary parties since M arx. M arx in the 
Communist Manifesto, Lenin in 1922, the 
Com intern in 1935 — all advanced jo in t 
program s of governm ent with the forces of 
social dem ocracy as a way of uniting the 
working class, winning over the peasants and 
middle class and isolating the forces of 
capital. Under the Gaullist regime such a 
program  was essential for uniting the 
opposition and reviving prospects for a non­
capitalist alternative.
T h e  p u r s u i t  o f  a p r o g r a m  fo r  
popular unity entailed the condem nation of 
those ultra-left slogans — power is for the 
asking, im agination takes power, all is now 
possible — that flourished in the general 
strike of M ay-June 1968. To suggest tha t the 
PC F would have made greater headway with 
a program  of self-management is to anticipate 
upon events. For even if the com m unists had 
been sufficiently de-stalinised to consider 
such a prospect in 1968, a perspective alien to 
both Second and Third Internationals, a 
program  of self-management would have 
been far less com prehensible to workers 
recovering from  ten years of repression and 
dem oralisation than  were dem ands for 
greater political and social democracy, for 
trade union rights and wage and hours 
improvements.
Launched by the social dem ocratic C FD T 
in solidarity with the student movement, the 
slogan of autogestion m eant everything and 
nothing. Gaullists and social dem ocrats, 
including elements of the C FD T , took it to 
mean worker participation in capitalist 
managem ent, while Trotskyists brandished it 
as a call for revolutionary power. As it was, 
only a small fringe of the working class, 
chiefly professional workers with links to the 
university, took it up as a concrete dem and
for corporate au tonom y.1 So hazy was its 
m eaning that most workers actually identified 
it with the program  of the PCF! As the P C F  
said at the time, dem ocratic political change 
by means of a com m on program  of the left 
was a precondition for any kind of 
autogestion involving working class control.
Post-1968 strategy
Despite the mistakes it made in dealing 
with the student movement, the P C F  was 
quick to  recover and to  incorporate lessons of 
M ay-June into its grand strategy. The 
M anifesto of Cham pigny issued in D ecem ber 
of tha t year was a new synthesis tha t m arked 
a decisive break with the Soviet bureaucratic 
m odel.2 It outlined the perspective of a
Mitterrand (top) and Marchais
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peaceful transition to  socialism without civil 
war, of a socialism respecting political 
pluralism  and liberty, and of a party  acting as 
the vanguard of the working class rather than 
an instrum ent of state control. The dynamic 
element in the strategy was working class 
struggle from below leading to com m on 
program s with social democracy that would 
be supported by popular forces at each stage 
of the way. To succeed with the strategy the 
PC F  had to avoid the shoals of reformism and 
extremism. The reform ist danger lay in a 
com m on program  that was not supported and 
articulated by independent initiatives and 
working class struggle, one that could be 
recuperated by reformist elements in the 
alliance. The extrem ist danger was a 
syndicalist strategy that concentrated on 
trade union and workplace activity to  the 
neglect of left unity and a com m on program . 
In the end, the PC F succeeded in com m itting 
both errors — the opportunist one during the 
period of the C om m on Program  and the 
ultra-left one since 1978.
The Com m on Program  signed in 1972, 
largely on the basis of the com m unists' own 
program , was the kind of transitional 
program  — similar in nature to that of the 
Paris Commune or Lenin's April Theses — 
that had always eluded the Second and Third 
Internationals. It sought to  free the state and 
economy from capitalist dom ination, to 
improve working and living conditions for the 
vast m ajority and to dem ocratise the 
institutions of daily life. Reflecting the 
strength of revolutionary forces in France, it 
was a more radical version of what had 
become known in English-speaking countries 
as the alternative economic strategy.3 Its main 
features were: 1) the nationalisation of all
credit institutions and key industrial groups 
to  give the public sector the capacity to 
control the private sector; 2) new powers for 
workers and unions to control production in 
the private sector and to  co-manage the public 
sector; 3) rises in wages and social 
expenditures linked to  increased productivity 
and output; 4) channelling production away 
from  specialised export, the global capitalist 
division of labor, tow ard meeting local
consum er and social needs and increased 
trade with third-w orld and socialist countries. 
Designed as a program  of government for five 
years (the life of parliam ent), it left room  for 
worker participation and initiative, notably 
with respect to dem ands for further 
nationalisation. It was a coherent program  of 
change, balancing supply and dem and factors 
under a new economic logic and offering 
credible prospects for peaceful transition 
within the basic institutions of the Fifth 
Republic.
Had the PC F  integrated this program  into 
its long-term strategy, had it avoided 
opportunist and ultra-left errors, it would 
have surely found it self further down the road 
to socialism today. It was handicapped in 
finding the proper equilibrium  by the Stalinist 
legacy. The Com intern under Stalin had 
forged monolithic parties that linked a 
dogmatic version of marxism with a highly 
c e n tra l is e d  c o m m a n d  s t r u c tu r e  an d  
agitational style of propaganda and work. 
For communists form ed in this mould de- 
stalinisation was an extremely difficult and 
painful process. R ather than return to the 
theoretical source and elaborate anew a 
strategy to suit particular national conditions, 
communists tended to  frame every issue in 
terns of the old versus the new, ancients and 
-m o d e rn s ,  S t a l i n i s t s  v e r s u s  E u r o -  
Communists. The fact that a policy was 
Stalinist, that it had been practised by 
communists between 1928 and 1956, was of 
course no more proof of error than of 
worthiness. No party  went through de- 
stalinisation w ithout some damage to its 
internal cohesion and fidelity to marxism.
In the case of the PCF, committed to a 
strict sense of unity, the debate took place not 
so much between sharply delineated factions 
as between old and new sensibilities, usually 
identified with the party  apparatus and 
intellectuals respectively, but often raging 
within each individual breast. Within the 
political bureau debates, kept a closely 
guarded secret, may have pitted old guard 
personalities like G aston Plissonnier and 
Claude Poperen along with the more complex 
Roland Leroy against the more liberal Paul
French communists 41
Laurent, Pierre Juquin  and Jean Kanapa on 
some but not all issues. Under the pressure of 
events and the socialist challenge the 
decisions taken by Georges M archais, the 
Secretary-General, were m arked by haste and 
im provisation. The most egregious example, 
from a theoretical point of view, was 
M a rc h a is ' su d d en  a n n o u n c e m e n t on 
television in 1976 that the PC F  was 
abandoning the doctrine of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. As dissident Althusserians 
pointed out, the PC F could repudiate the 
Stalinist dogm a, which associated proletarian 
rule with terror and the one-party state, but it 
could not banish a basic m arxist concept that 
was sy n o n y m o u s w ith  w o rk in g  class 
democracy.
Rank-and-file discussion
Nearly all the critical decisions of the '70s
— to sign the Com m on Program , to abandon 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, to accept 
the nuclear strike force, to break with the 
s o c ia l is ts  a n d  a d o p t  th e  strategie  
autogestionnaire — were taken without 
consultation of the rank and file and with only 
ce rem o n ia l d iscu ss io n  in the  ce n tra l 
committee. Kept in the dark about the 
debates, m otivations and reasoning of the 
political bureau, this committee could only 
rubber stam p decisions.4 With only laconic 
pronouncem ents to guide them, even 
members am enable to the leadership had a 
hard time following the party line. Due to the 
lack of clarity and political education, few 
members were capable of justifying the basic 
options of the C om m on Program  when they 
came under fire in 1977. By then, the 
le a d e rsh ip  w as faced  w ith  w iden ing  
divergences between those members, chiefly 
intellectuals, who thought the party had not 
gone far enough in the direction of Euro­
com m unism , and officials of the apparatus, 
who felt it had gone too far and was in danger 
of losing its strength and identity to the 
socialists. The practice of a highly uniform  
centralism that filtered out divergent opinions 
in the cells above the section level and that 
concealed debates am ong party leaders was 
not conducive to real political unity. A
leadership cut off from  party  debate — 
including its own — was not likely to  measure 
its words, weigh decisions, find adequate 
responses to  criticism and achieve proper 
synthesis.
The m ajor fault of analysis in the '70s 
concerned the nature of the new Socialist 
Party. The PCF treated the PS in a schematic 
way as a social dem ocratic party  that was 
naturally inclined to com prom ise with 
capitalism  and imperialism, but which could 
be pushed along the path to socialism by mass 
action. It could not conceive that an 
electoralist party composed of teachers, 
politicians and technocrats could be any more 
sincere about achieving socialism than  a blue- 
collar social dem ocratic party , it refused to 
e x p lo it , o r reco g n ise , th e  m an ifo ld  
contradictions in the PS between socialist 
ideals and reformist practices, between 
n a t i o n a l  g o a ls  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
com m itm ents, and am ong the diverse 
tendencies and personalities vying for 
M itterrand's attention. When the alliance 
broke down, the crude attacks on the PS as a 
social dem ocratic party returning to capitalist 
austerity, the NATO alliance, and a centrist 
coalition lacked credibility because they did 
not wholly correspond with reality. The fault 
of analysis was com pounded by a style of 
agitational propaganda. H am m ering slogans 
rather than seeking to persuade by suggestion 
and reasoning may be effective in peasant 
countries or am ong com m itted workers, but 
in this case drove intellectuals and sceptics 
away from  the party in droves.
A nother handicap — at least it turned out 
to be — was the Soviet connection. A nti­
com m unists succeeded in turning the strident 
anti-Sovietism  of the '70s — the U SSR as 
Gulag — against the party and its program . 
The actual degree of association with Soviet 
communism was far more limited than  people 
were led to believe. The PC F  had broken with 
the one-party state model of socialism 
beginning in 1963. As it chartered a 
dem ocratic path, it began to criticise 
measures of political repression in socialist 
countries and to call for dem ocratisation 
within the limits of existing institutions. By
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1978 criticism of bureaucratic distortions in 
the Soviet Union had reached Trotskyist 
proportions.5 The only respect in which 
fidelity to Moscow was unyielding was in the 
international arena. The PC F was determined 
not to support any position that might tend to 
weaken the Soviet bloc as a counter-weight to 
US and Western imperialism. Support for 
Soviet policy internationally made it even 
more imperative to distinguish PC F strategy 
from the Soviet model. Despite its strategie 
autogestionnaire the PCF paid a heavy price 
for its unqualified support for the Afghan 
invasion and more conditional approval of 
the martial law regime in Poland. Of the 
million or so voters who deserted the P C F  in 
1981, m ost expressed dissatisfaction with the 
party 's position in these m atters.6 But these 
positions proved to be a serious handicap 
on ly  b ecau se  o f  m o re  fu n d a m e n ta l 
weaknesses in party  policy and practice.
The Stalinist legacy made it difficult to deal 
with the challenges that came from  the New 
Left and SP. If the frontist strategy in 1968 
was basically sound, it was carried out with a 
crudeness and brutality that alienated an 
entire student generation who were accused of 
being unwitting tools of the bourgeoisie, if not 
agents provocateurs.7 Student radicals like 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit were more intent on 
crushing the ''Stalinist scum" than on 
overturning De Gaulle — their design was to 
confront De Gaulle over the corpse of the 
PC F  — but they did not represent the whole 
of the student movement whose aims 
deserved better than the ridicule and invective 
of the PC F . A less defensive party  would have 
known how to take up the dem ands of the 
"new" social categories —  youth, women, 
immigrants, professionals and the unskilled, 
radicalised by M ay-June. Instead, the PC F 
allowed itself to be outm anoeuvred by the 
C FD T  which could criticise their excesses 
while sympathising with their aspirations. As 
a result of the alienation of these categories, 
the communist-led CGT lost its unquestioned 
leadership over the trade union movement.
After 1972 the P C F  mishandled the 
problem s arising from left unity. The results
of the alliance were more positive than the 
PCF is now willing to admit. During the 
period 1972-1978 the PC F  doubled its 
membership — to 700,000 — increased its 
total num ber of votes (while suffering an 
erosion of less than one percent) and hold 
over local governments, m aintained a high 
level of strike activity of a political character 
during a period of industrial decline, won 
wide acceptance for its dem and for a role in 
government and popularised the themes that 
underlay M itterrand 's presidential platform
— n a tio n a lis a t io n , re in d u s tr ia lis a tio n , 
greater equality of income and wealth, and an 
increase in popular consum ption.8
The problem  with the Com m on Program  
was not the form  of unity — nothing 
prevented the P C F  from  criticising the PS or 
taking independent initiatives — but the 
opportunistic way in which the program  was 
prom oted and justified. Until 1977 the party 
treated it with alm ost the same inattention as 
M itterrand, as an electoral platform  and 
symbol of unity ra ther than a series of 
measures to change society. In the 1973 
elections, the PC F  presented itself as the 
guaran tor of the program , but it neglected to 
explain or justify the measures it contained. 
D oubts about socialist sincerity, expressed in 
a secret report to the central committee, were 
hushed up. In the Presidential election of 
1974, the PC F  rallied unconditionally to 
M itterrand who not only presented a much 
attenuated platform , but recruited rightwing 
critics of the C om m on Program  like Michel 
Rochard to his cam paign staff.
Following M itterrand 's narrow  defeat, the 
PC F tried to em ulate the socialists' 
electoralism by calling for a union of the 
entire French people against m onopoly 
capital and by soft-pedalling the socialist 
character of the program . The sudden 
reversal — the outburst of attacks on the PS
— that occurred after losses in six by- 
elections in Septem ber seemed motivated by 
narrow partisan concerns. R ather than make 
a detailed critique of the accom m odationist 
trends in the PS — M itterrand 's swing away 
from the leftwing CERES and alliance with 
the R icardians, his penchant for "brilliant"
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technocrats like Jacques Delors and Jacques 
Attali — the party simply accused the PS of 
abandoning the program  and accepting 
capitalist austerity. Instead of pinning 
M itterrand dow n on his interpretation of the 
program , it relented on its criticism once he 
protested his loyalty and agreed to a series of 
mass meetings to denounce capitalist 
austerity. W ithout the m aterial evidence of 
socialist accom m odation, P C F  polemics 
merely bewildered and angered newcomers to 
the left who had never personally experienced 
social dem ocratic betrayal.
By the time the P C F  did undertake its full- 
scale cam paign against socialist betrayal, 
which was real,9 it had become so enmeshed in 
the myth of left unity tha t it could only 
criticise its partner at its peril. The party 
waited too long, until after it had racked up 
municipal gains on jo in t lists with the 
socialists, before proposing the necessary 
updating of the program . Indications are that 
it was taken by surprise by M itterrand 's 
obduracy, his unwillingness to discuss new 
terms, his refusal to  com prom ise, his 
insistence on keeping a tree hand. By standing 
up to the PC F , M itterrand indeed hoped to 
increase his popularity and to  force the party 
into accepting an auxiliary role. By 
background and training, P C F  leaders were 
prepared to expect ideological deviation, but 
the Gaullist hau teur and rule of M itterrand 
was som ething they did not know how to 
handle. Several years of complaisance 
punctuated by occasional fits of ill tem per 
had left the P C F  in a weak position to counter 
M itterrand's design.
In retrospect, the PC F  cam paign for the 
program  against the socialists, which was 
decried by some liberal elements in the party 
at the time, appears fully justified, but it was 
conducted with the subtlety of a sledge­
hammer. Instead of exploiting the manifold 
contradictions in socialist positions — made 
apparent in the course of negotiations — the 
party simply denounced the PS as a social 
dem ocratic party  that had turned to  the right 
under pressure from  the bourgeoisie and 
G erm an Social Democracy, accepting the 
need for w orking class austerity and
preparing the way for a reversal of alliances 
with the centre-right. The party  did not 
explore the possibility of a "third way" 
whereby the PS would implement an 
attenuated version of the C om m on Program  
with the PC F  in harness in a Left alliance. 
W hile the P C F  was virtually forced in M ay 
1981 to  accept the possibility of a "third way" 
under the more favorable conditions of a 
M itterrand presidency, it could not have 
afforded to  surrender to  a PS oriented further 
to the right under Giscard, w ithout a fight. If, 
on balance, the propositions of the PS in 1978 
were no more accom m odating to  capital than 
those of 198110, M itterrand was then allied 
with Rocardian advocates of austerity who 
would have weighed heavily in a left
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government. But for its com bination of 
opportunist and sectarian errors, the PC F 
nevertheless could have won the fight.
Once the decision to  break was taken — 
neither side was interested in compromise 
after Septem ber — the P C F  veered to  the left 
when it announced tha t it would no longer 
autom atically w ithdraw for a better placed 
socialist on the second round and that it 
would run its own Presidential candidate in 
1981. Little notice was taken of a decision 
approved w ithout discussion tha t not only 
m arked a reversal of PC F  policy but also of a 
d e e p ly -ro o te d  tra d i t io n  o f  re p u b lic a n  
discipline against the right. The inference 
draw n was that the P C F  considered the 
socialists to  be no better than  the right, a 
startling suggestion that was to  have 
disastrous consequences in 1981.
R ather than open discussion on the reasons 
for the defeat of the Program  in the M arch 
elections — a strong com m unist vote might 
have saved it — the party  clamped down on 
debate and castigated those dissident 
intellectuals who were criticising from  behind 
the security of their professorial chairs. The 
leadership drew into its bunker, the industrial 
working class, and quietly abandoned the 
struggle for unity and the Com m on Program . 
In the absence of any project for left unity, 
voters were left with no hope for political 
change. To satisfy the need for change the
PC F  substituted its so-called strategic 
autogestionnaire. According to this strategy, 
workers would achieve through trade union 
struggles those reforms that would anticipate 
upon socialism .11 This was precisely the kind 
of syndicalist strategy that the P C F  had 
denounced in the CFD T! Its reform ist limits 
had just been tested in the trade union 
cam paign to save the French steel industry. 
So long as the state remained under capitalist 
dom ination, a situation which the P C F  had 
no strategy for changing, how could trade 
union struggles result in anything but the mild 
reformism of the C FD T  and FO?
The blunders com m itted in the 1981 
Presidential campaign flowed directly from 
the new strategy; indeed, they were made 
deliberately to  accustom  people to it. 12 The
P C F  had abandoned left unity and the hopes 
of electoral victory to  the socialists in order to 
concentrate on workplace struggles. It 
assumed that its vanguard role in the factories 
would eventually be rewarded at the polls, 
forgetting that voters respond to  quite 
different appeals and m otivations from  
strikers. Since the experience of the Com m on 
Program  had presum ably shown that workers 
could not understand abstract and general 
program s, they were to be presented with 131 
separate objectives of struggle, all draw n from 
the Program ! In a cam paign that put struggle 
before persuasion, M archais was given free 
rein to  act out the role of the aggrieved 
working class primitive who delighted in 
scandalising self-satisfied bourgeois and 
confounding simpering TV journalists. Short 
on media coverage, for reasons for which it 
was partly responsible, the P C F  relied upon 
enthusiastic solidarity meetings with the blue- 
c o l la r  f a i th f u l  a n d  c o m m a n d o - lik e  
propaganda of the deed — the bulldozing at 
Vitry, the shutdow n of a live television 
discussion on youth and unem ploym ent 
which had deliberately excluded the CGT, the 
vigilante denunciation, w ithout adequate 
proof, of drug traffickers at M ontigny.
The broadsides fired at the PS fell even 
wider of the m ark than in 1978, for 
M itterrand had taken a few turns to the left in
1979 when he m arginalised Rocard. Taking 
no notice of the shift, the P C F  now flatly 
asserted that M itterrand was no better than 
Giscard; nay,-his com m itm ent to the A tlantic 
alliance made him even worse. M itterrand's 
platform , draw n from  basic options of the 
Com m on Program , was denounced as a 
smokescreen for capitalist austerity. From  the 
faulty analysis came a tactical error that 
proved fatal in M ay — the refusal to 
guarantee support for M itterrand on the 
second round. If the M archais candidacy had 
been presented as a way of leaning on 
M itterrand and pushing him to the left, it 
would have attracted  a much larger following 
that would have given the P C F  greater 
leverage with the new regime. By refusing to 
acknowlede that a M itterrand presidency 
could be an instrum ent of change, the PC F  
confirmed suspicions that it might by calling
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for abstention on the second round, play the 
spoiler role and help re-elect Giscard (some 
old guard leaders may indeed have favored 
this tactic in hopes of splitting up the PS). To 
vote for M archais under these conditions was 
to  risk the re-election of Giscard. One quarter 
of the P C F  electorate deserted because they 
preferred even a reform ist socialist to 
accelerating unem ploym ent and industrial 
decline.
The grey of P C F  strategy was overtaken by 
the green of popular will. The collapse of the 
P C F  vote and swing tow ard M itterrand, 
wholly unexpected, compelled the realisation 
that he was not only better than  Giscard, but 
that with his own hesitating gait and 
European rhythm , he might even open the 
way to  socialism. In his first year of office, 
M itterrand carried out most o f his pledges, 
ta k in g  m e a s u re s  to  in c re a s e  so c ia l 
expenditure, the m inimum wage and public 
service em ploym ent, to  open space for union 
and worker initiative, to decentralise the state 
and guarantee civil liberties, and to 
nationalise all credit institutions and seven 
key industrial concerns. Falling into line 
w ithout in the least revising its strategie 
autogestionnaire which was quite compatible 
with reformism, the P C F  agreed to  keep its 
own action and criticism within the bounds 
set by the voters in May. W ithout apologising 
for recent aggressions against the PS, the 
P C F  subscribed to  a new rule of conduct "not 
so much to denounce as to explain, not to 
much criticise as propose, and not only 
propose, but construct, achieve, realise, 
concretise".13 It used its participation in 
governm ent to  urge it forw ard, its legislative 
function in parliam ent to weigh the positive, 
negative and insufficient, and its trade union 
position to accom plish in the workplace what 
the governm ent and legislature had failed to 
do by law. As a party of governm ent and 
struggle, the P C F  enjoyed the benefits of 
being in both  worlds, gaining recognition for 
the dedicated work of its ministers and for the 
com bativity of its m ilitants in the factories. In 
sh o rt, the  P C F  w as co m p e lled  by 
circumstances to  adopt a position of critical
support, of unity and struggle, of struggle 
within unity, for its socialist partners.
If the P C F  currently enjoys such an 
enviable position as a party  of governm ent 
andstruggle, why undertake criticism of past 
and recent errors? The P C F  has been 
seriously weakened by the defeat of M ay 10. 
Satisfied with its role of tribune and vanguard 
of the w orking class, it has surrendered to  its 
stronger inter-classist partner the job  of 
determ ining national policy and goals. 
W hatever happens to the governing coalition, 
the P C F  is not likely to  recuperate its electoral 
losses in the next four years. N or with the 
most com bative trade unionists in the world, 
is the CGT likely to regain leadership over all 
elements of the working class, particularly 
white collar workers, so long as the P C F  lies 
under a political cloud. In late 1981, the CGT 
was running with the wind, gaining in factory 
elections for the first time since 1969, until 
m artial law was declared — with the 
acquiescence of the P C F  and C G T — in 
Poland.
M itterrand has forced the P C F  to play an 
auxiliary role which will not be easily 
overcome. The P C F  has been impressed into 
service of a regime whose destiny is by no 
means assured. The contradictions of French 
socialism — between socialist ideals and an 
a c c o m m o d a t io n is t  p r a c t ic e ,  b e tw e e n  
advocates and opponents of austerity, 
between socialist domestic policies and 
E u ro p e a n  C o m m u n ity  tra d e  p o lic ie s , 
between support for the Third W orld and a 
com m itm ent to  US militarism — have yet to  
be resolved. How to increase wages, social 
expenditures and em ploym ent in an  econom y 
open to  com petition from  W estern partners in
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the midst of the greatest depression in half a 
century?
The structural reforms of the first year 
accom panied by m inor wage and hours gains 
may have arrested economic decline, but they 
have not produced sustained growth or 
reduced unemployment. In  the absence of 
firm  government directives the newly 
nationalised firms have continued to 
implement prior corporate plans for lay-offs, 
shutdowns and foreign investment. The first 
anniversary of the M itterrand election was 
m arked by a record balance of trade deficit 
and the announcem ent of a social pause, 
in c lu d in g  ta x  re lie f  fo r  b u sin ess , a 
m oratorium  on new social expenditures and 
reforms, and a wage-price freeze that will 
reduce average real income over the next two 
years. Restraints on social expenditures and 
new taxes on working people were features of 
the recent 1983 budget.
By aim ing to  please all classes the French 
government may end up satisfying none. 
Appeasement of big business has neither 
spurred industrial investment nor disarmed 
the hostility of the right while it has 
disappointed workers who have yet to  see any 
general im provem ent in working and living 
conditions, the absence o f working class 
enthusiasm  was apparent in the local cantonal 
elections in M arch which were won by an 
aroused right wing. Preparations for local 
municipal elections in march 1983 do not 
augur well for the Left.
The P C F  knows that the way to industrial 
recovery under M itterrand will be crooked 
and narrow. It has probably averted a more 
serious drift to the right and austerity. The 
tragedy of past and recent errors is that it may 
have lost the capacity to  stay the course.
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